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UNDER THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT 
SARAH ANNE MOURER* 
INTRODUCTION 
obby Joe Leaster never committed a crime in his life.  As a 
child, his worst misbehavior was sneaking off to go fishing 
when he was supposed to be in church.1  On September 27, 1970, 
Bobby Joe was arrested and charged with a murder that he did not 
commit.  Late that afternoon, a man named Levi Whiteside was shot 
and killed during a holdup at a neighborhood store.  Bobby Joe was 
standing on a nearby street corner on his way to visit his nephew.  
Bobby Joe was wearing clothes that matched eyewitness descriptions 
of the man who killed Levi Whiteside.  The police detained him and 
took him to Boston City Hospital where Kathleen Whiteside had just 
identified her husband’s body.  She had been administered sedatives 
twice already, but she was still hysterical.  She had been present at her 
husband’s murder, held at gunpoint by the assailant, and looked the 
perpetrator in the face for at least three minutes.2  The police 
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 1. Charles Kenney, Justice for Bobby Joe, THE BOSTON GLOBE MAGAZINE, Feb. 28, 
1988, available at http://www.nodp.org/ma/stacks/b_leaster.html. 
 2. Commonwealth v. Leaster, 479 N.E.2d 124, 126 (Mass. 1985). 
B 
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presented only Bobby Joe to her, in handcuffs, asking, “Is this him?”  
She identified him.  He spent fifteen years in prison as a result.3 
The prosecutor did have corroborating evidence against Bobby 
Joe.  At a grand jury hearing, a witness from the store also identified 
Bobby Joe.4  Bobby Joe also told police that he was with his girlfriend 
at the time of the murder.  When the police attempted to confirm his 
alibi with Bobby Joe’s girlfriend, she denied it.5  Subsequently, 
exculpatory evidence came to light.  A Boston schoolteacher saw a 
photograph of Bobby Joe in a magazine article and knew that he had 
been wrongfully convicted.  The schoolteacher had been near the 
scene moments after the murder and had seen two men fleeing, 
neither of whom were Bobby Joe.  Bobby Joe was exonerated after 
spending 16 years in prison, from 1970 to 1986.6 
Courts today continue to allow into evidence suggestive 
identification testimony similar to that in Bobby Joe’s case.  Currently, 
courts consider the admissibility of identification testimony under a 
Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process analysis.7  If a court 
determines that a pretrial identification was unnecessarily suggestive, 
it then ascertains whether the suggestive procedure gave rise to a 
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.8  A court will 
find a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification only if 
the identification is found to be unreliable.9  Therefore, even if the 
court concludes that a police identification procedure was suggestive, 
it may be admissible if the court finds that the identification is 
nevertheless likely to be accurate.10  A court will balance the 
suggestiveness of the identification procedure against the likelihood 
that the identification is correct, resulting in an unprincipled rule of 
law that turns on the court’s subjective assessment of the defendant’s 
guilt.11  As Bobby Joe’s case demonstrates, courts will admit 
misidentifications, and juries will convict in reliance upon them.12 
 
 3. See Kenney, supra note 1. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 196 (1972). 
 8. See Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 107 (1977). 
 9. Id. at 114. 
 10. Id. 
 11. The Court’s current due process approach has created significant confusion, and as a 
result, there is no uniformity between courts on the issue of whether corroborating evidence of 
guilt should be used to assess the validity of an identification.  Seven circuit courts disagree 
about whether this factor should be included.  The First, Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits 
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Given these serious drawbacks with the due process approach, this 
Article reexamines police eyewitness identification procedures13 in 
the first instance under the Fourth Amendment.  It explains why a 
suggestive lineup may properly be a Fourth Amendment concern.  It 
also explores why such an analysis may be more effective in excluding 
identification testimony at trial because of the objectives of the 
Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule.14  Under this rule, all 
identification testimony resulting from suggestive lineups would be 
suppressed, whether or not the identification is thought to be 
accurate.  Furthermore, a Fourth Amendment approach to lineups 
better lends itself to the imposition of clear and consistent guidelines 
than does the current due process analysis. 
Analyzing lineups under the Fourth Amendment may accomplish 
two goals.  First, if courts find it persuasive, it can correct the ways in 
which the courts have failed and provide the most effective means to 
protect the innocent from wrongful convictions resulting from 
misidentifications.  Second, even if courts do not find it immediately 
persuasive, using a Fourth Amendment lens can still provide a useful 
basis for understanding the shortcomings of the current due process 
test under the Fourteenth Amendment.  This Article raises many 
issues that will require significant dialogue before effective solutions 
may be reached.  The regulations and criteria recommended in this 
Article are suggestions designed in hopes of sparking debate and 
furthering scholarly discussion. 
 
consider other evidence of guilt, while the Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits only look to the 
reliability of the identification itself.  See Suzannah B. Gambell, The Need to Revisit the Neil v. 
Biggers Factors: Suppressing Unreliable Eyewitness Identifications, 6 WYO. L. REV. 189, 210 
(2006). 
 12. See Timothy P. O’Toole & Giovanna Shay, Manson v. Braithwaite Revisited: Towards a 
New Rule of Decision for Due Process Challenges to Eyewitness Identification Procedures, 41 
VAL. U.L. REV. 109, 110 (2006) (noting that eighty-eight percent of rape case exonerations and 
fifty percent of murder case exonerations have been due to misidentifications). 
 13. “Police eyewitness identification procedures” include lineups and show-ups and may be 
referred to hereinafter simply as “lineups.”  A “show-up” is an identification procedure where 
only one individual or photo is presented to the witness for possible identification. 
 14. The exclusionary rule, as it applies to the Fourth Amendment, has a remedial function.  
See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391 (1914).   The benefits of applying the exclusionary 
rule to eyewitness testimony outweigh the social cost.  Application of the exclusionary rule in 
Fourth Amendment violations typically excludes valid evidence.  However, application of the 
exclusionary rule for suggestive eyewitness identification procedures will often exclude invalid 
evidence, specifically misidentifications. 
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Section I discusses the problem of misidentifications.  
Misidentifications are the leading cause of wrongful convictions,15 and 
many result from unregulated lineups and identification procedures.16  
Section II presents an overview of human memory function and 
discusses how suggestion influences memory.  Section III 
demonstrates why lineups are a significantly unreliable police 
investigatory procedure and how suggestion pervades lineups.  The 
accuracy of an eyewitness identification procedure rests largely on 
memory, a human function uniquely prone to molding, suggestive 
influence, and error.17  Section IV reviews the current due process law 
regarding suggestive identification procedures.  Currently, courts 
permit eyewitness identification testimony resulting from even highly 
suggestive identification procedures if the court determines that the 
identification was “reliable.”18  Courts use a set of factors to decide if 
an identification is “reliable,” but these do not reliably indicate by 
themselves that the identification is accurate.19 
Section V explains how a claim regarding an unregulated or 
suggestive lineup is supportable under the Fourth Amendment.20  This 
Article proposes that an unregulated lineup is an unreasonable 
seizure under the Fourth Amendment.  Although one might initially 
assume this notion lacks support, a closer look at the case law and 
intent of the Fourth Amendment will reveal that the unreasonable 
risk to the individual in a suggestive or unregulated lineup is a Fourth 
Amendment concern.  Indeed, courts have suggested that the 
reliability of a police investigatory procedure is relevant in terms of 
the Fourth Amendment.21  This Article proposes that, in addition to 
the physical intrusion of the seizure, the lack of reliability in 
 
 15. See Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 through 2003, 95 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 542 (2005). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Elizabeth F. Loftus, Memory Faults and Fixes, ISSUES IN SCI. AND TECH., Summer 
2002, at 43. 
 18. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 197 (1972). 
 19. See David E. Paseltiner, Twenty-Years of Diminishing Protection: A Proposal to Return 
to the Wade Trilogy Standards, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 583, 606 (Spring 1987). 
 20. The skeptical reader should withhold judgment and render a verdict after reading the 
entire Article. 
 21. See, e.g., Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969).  In Davis, the United States 
Supreme Court determined that the defendant could be fingerprinted with less than probable 
cause, in part because fingerprinting is a reliable scientific police investigatory procedure.  Davis 
went as far as to comment that probable cause was not required because fingerprinting is not as 
prone to error as police investigatory procedures such as lineups. 
02__MOURER_FINAL.DOC 7/23/2008  9:33:03 AM 
2008] REFORMING EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 53 
eyewitness identification procedures also triggers Fourth Amendment 
protections. 
Section VI recommends two types of procedural safeguards that 
should be required before courts admit identification testimony.  First, 
there must be reasonable suspicion that the individual has committed 
the crime for which identification is sought.  Section VI places this 
proposal in the context of the varying standards for different kinds of 
intrusions under current Fourth Amendment law.  Second, nine 
guidelines should be used to evaluate lineups.  This section briefly lays 
out these guidelines and explains why their use will significantly 
reduce the likelihood of misidentifications.  Section VII then discusses 
exceptions to the use of these procedural safeguards. 
This Article proposes that analyzing eyewitness identification 
procedures through a Fourth Amendment perspective will help clarify 
the problems with courts’ current approaches.  Such an assessment is 
a useful starting point to evaluate and highlight the issues surrounding 
the current standards.  Viewing the suggestion involved with 
eyewitness identification procedures as a Fourth Amendment issue 
may seem unconventional initially.  This Article does not intend to 
provide all of the answers and single-handedly create new standards 
for lineups under the Fourth Amendment.  Rather, this Article’s 
primary goals are to begin a discourse on the impact of the Fourth 
Amendment on identification procedures and to provide guidance in 
the area of reform for eyewitness identification procedures generally. 
I.  WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 
Available numbers regarding exonerations reflect only a small 
fraction of wrongful convictions and innocent individuals jailed and 
prosecuted.  Many experts estimate that wrongful convictions may 
amount to as many as five percent of all convictions each year.22  With 
the aid of DNA testing, exonerations now number 207 nationwide.23  
Yet, DNA testing may reveal only a very small percentage of the 
actual wrongful convictions, as only ten percent of felony cases 
 
 22. See Gambell, supra note 11, at 190 (citing ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS & JAMES M. DOYLE, 
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 4-1 (3d ed. 1997)). 
 23. Innocence Project: Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, 
Eyewitness Misidentification in Florida and Nationwide, http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/ 
FloridaMistakenID.pdf.  Exonerations are not limited to DNA testing.  See Gross et al., supra 
note 15, at 524 (reporting that since 1989, 340 people have been exonerated after conviction of 
serious crimes). 
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involve biological evidence that could be utilized for testing.24  In 
addition, not all of the ten percent are actually tested.  Many accused 
who plead guilty or “no contest” to the crime are not eligible for 
DNA testing even if biological evidence exists.25  National estimates 
indicate that there are at least 10,000 wrongful convictions each year.26  
Many more innocent people are arrested and prosecuted, though 
ultimately not convicted. 
Misidentification accounts for more wrongful convictions than all 
other causes combined.27  Recent studies and research confirm that an 
individual placed in an unregulated identification procedure incurs a 
substantial risk of being misidentified, jailed, and even wrongfully 
convicted.28  In the first eighty-two DNA exonerations, mistaken 
eyewitness identification was a factor more than seventy percent of 
the time, making it the leading cause of wrongful convictions in DNA 
cases.29  An example of a dangerously unreliable eyewitness 
identification procedure occurred in the highly publicized Duke 
lacrosse team case, in which the identification procedure involved 
only suspects. 30  This extreme example serves to remind us of the 
degree of error and significant suggestion in police lineups.  Up to 
eighty percent of the time, juries believe witnesses making eyewitness 
identifications, regardless of whether the witnesses are correct.31  
Eyewitness identification testimony compels juries to convict.32 
II.  MEMORY AND SUGGESTION 
A specific look at how memory functions and how suggestion 
operates illustrates why participation in unregulated lineups creates 
unreasonable risks of misidentification.  Identification procedures 
 
 24. Comments of the Florida Innocence Initiative, Inc. at 5, In re Amendment to the 
Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 3.853, No. SC05-1702 (Fla. amended/adopted Sept. 
21, 2006). 
 25. The Justice Project, FL: Post-Conviction DNA Testing Update and Death Row 
Exoneration, THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORMER: Vol. 3. No. 3. (Washington D.C.), Mar. 23, 
2006, at 4, at  http://www.thejusticeproject.org/about/newsletter/the-criminal-justice-1.html#FL. 
 26. See Gambell, supra note 11, at 190. 
 27. Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification: Systemic Reforms, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 615, 623 
(2006). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Richard A. Rosen, Innocence and Death, 82 N.C. L. REV. 61, 70 n.32 (2003). 
 30. See Aaron Beard, Duke Prosecutor is Under Heavier Fire, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 
28, 2006, http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=2756978. 
 31. Gary L. Wells et al., Effects of Expert Psychological Advice on Human Performance in 
Judging the Validity of Eyewitness Testimony, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 275, 278 (1980). 
 32. Id. 
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differ from other police investigatory procedures in that they solely 
rely on human memory.33  Human memory consists of three basic 
systems: (1) encoding, (2) storage, and (3) retrieval.34  “Encoding” is 
the initial processing of an event that results in a memory.  “Storage” 
is the retention of the encoded information.  “Retrieval” is the 
recovery of the stored information.35  Errors can occur at each step.  
Contrary to common understanding of memory, not everything that 
registers in the central nervous system is permanently stored in the 
mind and particular details become increasingly inaccessible over 
time.36 
In fact, details are often permanently lost.37  To be mistaken about 
details in the recollection of an event is completely normal and not a 
function of a poor memory.  We can even come to believe that we 
remember events that never actually occurred.38  When people 
construct a memory, they gather fragments of what they have stored 
and fill in the gaps with what makes most sense to them.39  Human 
beings recall events by adding these bits and pieces to their 
recollections based on their subjective understandings of the world.  
As Professors Loftus and Ketchum note, “Truth and reality, when 
seen through the filters of our memories, are not objective facts but 
subjective, interpretive realities.”40  Because these processes are 
unconscious, individuals generally perceive their memories as 
completely accurate and their reporting of what they remember as 
entirely truthful, no matter how distorted or inaccurate they, in fact, 
may be.41  An individual’s memories become distorted even in the 
absence of external suggestion or internal personal distress.  Naturally, 
people tailor their telling of events to the listener and the context.  
Each act of telling or retelling changes the teller’s memory of the 
 
 33. Confessions and interrogations are highly unreliable as well, because the results are 
dependent on the functioning of the human mind. 
 34. RICHARD GERRIG & PHILIP ZIMBARDO, PSYCHOLOGY AND LIFE 209–10 (17th ed. 
2005). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. ELIZABETH LOFTUS & KATHERINE KETCHAM, WITNESS FOR THE DEFENSE: THE 
ACCUSED, THE EYEWITNESS, AND THE EXPERT WHO PUTS MEMORY ON TRIAL 20 (1991). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
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event.42  Loftus and Ketchum explain, “This is why a fish story, which 
grows with each telling, can eventually lead the teller to believe it.”43 
Many conditions such as fear, lighting, distance from the event, 
surprise, and personal biases all affect memory and recall.44  For 
example, racial stereotypes may affect memory and recall.  
Preconceptions, conscious or unconscious, shape our memories.  In 
one study, participants were shown four news stories, each containing 
an identical photograph of the same African-American man.  The 
stories described: (1) a college professor, (2) a basketball player, (3) a 
non-violent crime, and (4) a violent crime.  After viewing the photos 
and reading the stories, the participants were asked to reconstruct the 
photo of the man for each story by selecting from choices of facial 
features.  The stories involving criminal conditions resulted in the 
selection of more pronounced characteristically African-American 
facial features.  This was particularly true for the violent crime 
scenario.45  Participants’ preconceived notions and stereotypes 
affected their choices. 
Human memory is indeed delicate, especially regarding victims 
and witnesses of crimes.  Fear and traumatic events may impair the 
initial acquisition of the memory itself.46  At the time of an 
identification, the witness is often in a distressed emotional state.  
Many victims and witnesses experience substantial shock because of 
their traumatic experiences that continue to affect them at the time of 
identification procedures.  In eyewitness identification procedures, 
witness motivation to make an identification may also be very 
powerful.  Such witnesses may seek rapid resolution and closure, 
possibly leading to hasty identifications of fillers47 in the absence of 
 
 42. Laura Engelhardt, The Problem with Eyewitness Testimony: Commentary on a Talk by 
George Fisher and Barbara Tversky, 1 STAN. J. LEGAL STUD. 25, 27 (1999). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Penn State, Readers’ Memories Of Crime Stories Influenced By Racial Stereotypes, 
SCIENCE DAILY, May 6, 2004, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2004/05/040506073047.htm 
(last visited February 28, 2008). 
 46. Id.  However, courts persist in erroneously believing that witnesses experiencing 
elevated emotional states produce more accurate recollections or perceptions.  For example, in 
Howard v. Bouchard, 405 F.3d 459, 473 (6th Cir. 2005), the court found that the identification 
was admissible in part because the witness was in a heightened state of stress at the time of the 
event and presumably would better remember the perpetrator as a result. 
 47. A “filler” is a known innocent person placed in a lineup. 
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the true perpetrator.  Furthermore, their recall is often distorted and 
untrustworthy because of their traumatic experiences.48 
The presence of a weapon may also influence a witness’s ability to 
recall the face of the perpetrator.  Studies show that when a weapon is 
present during an event, perpetrator recognition ability is impaired.49  
The witness may be focusing on the weapon, instead of the culprit, 
during the criminal episode.  In one study where the weapon was 
placed in a prominent location, recall was worse than when the 
weapon was partially hidden or off to the side.50  Other studies 
indicate that the location of the weapon does not affect memory 
accuracy.51  Another explanation may be that the witness is more 
alarmed and experiences a higher arousal level in the presence of a 
weapon, which in turn impairs memory acquisition.  Some studies 
show an absence of the “weapon effect” in non-arousing classroom or 
laboratory settings.52  A variety of other external factors influence and 
may impair a witness’s ability to recall an event or the face of a 
perpetrator.  For example, witnesses have difficulty identifying 
perpetrators cross-racially, which may relate to individual internal 
biases.  Studies show accurate suspect identification rates are much 
greater under same-race conditions.53  In addition, older adults have 
increased difficulty with cognitive performance and perform worse in 
identification procedures.  Ironically, older adults who recall more 
details about a culprit are actually more likely to make false 
identifications.54 
Memory and recall are highly susceptible to suggestion.  For 
example, studies show that misinformation following an event may 
lead to incorrect recall of the event.55  If a victim is told that the 
perpetrator was holding a gun after observing the perpetrator holding 
a knife, the victim may subsequently report that she recalls seeing the 
perpetrator holding a gun.  Researchers have called this phenomenon 
 
 48. See Tom Singer, To Tell the Truth, Memory Isn’t that Good, 63 MONT. L. REV. 337, 360 
(2002). 
 49.  See Nancy Steblay, A Meta-analytic Review of the Weapon Focus Effect, 16 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 413, 413–24 (1992). 
 50. See Thomas H. Kramer, Robert Buckhout & Paul Eugenio, Weapon Focus, Arousal, 
and Eyewitness Memory: Attention Must be Paid, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 167, 167–84 (1990). 
 51. See Steblay, supra note 49. 
 52. See Kramer et al., supra note 50. 
 53. See Bruce W. Behrman & Sherrie L. Davey, Eyewitness Identification in Actual 
Criminal Cases: An Archival Analysis, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 475, 475–91 (2001). 
 54. Id. 
 55. See Singer, supra note 48. 
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the “misinformation effect.”  Witnesses who report such 
unconsciously adopted misinformation do so as rapidly and 
confidently as they would report an actual memory.56 
Post-event information may also profoundly impair and alter a 
witness’s recollection of an individual or event.  In an illustrative 
study from 1974, Loftus and Palmer showed two separate groups of 
participants the same video of two speeding cars and asked them to 
estimate their speed.  In one group the participants were asked, “How 
fast were the cars going when they smashed?”  In the other group, the 
participants were asked, “How fast were the cars going when they 
contacted each other?”  The participants who were asked about the 
“smashing” cars estimated the speeds as over 40 mph.  Participants 
who were asked about the cars “contacting” each other estimated the 
speeds as only 30 mph.57  When the participants were asked if they 
saw any broken glass (there was no broken glass), a third of the 
“smash” participants reporting seeing broken glass while only 
fourteen percent of the “contact” participants did so.58  The choice of 
words influences participants’ perceptions. 
Human memory is fragile and decidedly prone to suggestive 
influence.  When placed in the context of an eyewitness identification 
procedure, suggestion may have a powerful impact on a witness’s 
memory and substantially alter the witness’s identification testimony. 
III.  SUGGESTION IN LINEUPS 
Individuals who participate in lineups are exposed to a substantial 
risk of misidentification resulting from suggestion.  How does 
suggestion in identification procedures result in this risk to the 
suspect?  Suggestion, in the context of eyewitness identifications, is 
the process by which a witness identifies an individual based on 
criteria other than the witness’s independent memory of the event 
alone.  It is surprisingly simple for a police identification procedure to 
become highly suggestive.  Very subtle and completely inadvertent 
circumstances may influence a witness’s choice during a lineup 
procedure.  A witness may feel unconscious pressure to identify 
someone in the lineup in order to feel that she has not failed her job 
or disappointed the officer.  Thus, a police officer’s mere presence 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. See GERRIG & ZIMBARDO, supra note 34. 
 58. Id. 
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may exert powerful influence on the witness to make an identification 
not solely based on independent recall of the event.  Even the most 
regulated identification procedure carries with it a high risk of 
misidentification. 
The most well-meaning and hard-working police officer may 
inadvertently create a suggestive identification procedure.  On the 
other hand, occasionally officers do a less than thorough job at 
creating a fair lineup, or they even employ intentional suggestion and 
influence on the witness to choose the suspect.  Many police officers 
are no strangers to trickery and mischief in the name of apprehending 
criminals.  The officer or lineup administrators may unconsciously 
suggest the identity of the suspect in a lineup in numerous, subtle 
ways.  For example, if the suspect is number three in the lineup, the 
officer may tell the witness to take her time as she looks at number 
three.  This may alert the witness to number three in the lineup.  The 
officer may also falsely bolster the witness’s confidence in the 
identification by making statements to her following the identification 
(“you picked the suspect”).  These confirming statements 
(“confirming feedback”) serve to reinforce the witness’s belief that 
she identified the proper individual and may actually transform her 
memory of the event to correlate with her viewing of that suspect 
pursuant to the “misinformation effect.”59  Subsequently, the witness 
will appear highly confident of her identification at trial and influence 
the jury.  Therefore, an earnest officer who knows the identity of the 
suspect, and in good faith believes in the suspect’s guilt, may provide 
the eyewitness with confirming feedback that taints the witness’s 
testimony at trial. 
Despite human memory’s delicate nature and identification 
procedures’ unique susceptibility to bias and suggestion, courts 
routinely allow prosecutors to use suggestive eyewitness 
identifications as evidence against an accused.  In part, this is a result 
of the view that suggestion in lineups as solely a due process issue.  
Wrongful convictions result. 
 
 59. See Wells, supra note 27, at 621. 
02__MOURER_FINAL.DOC 7/23/2008  9:33:03 AM 
60 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 3:49 
IV.  LINEUPS UNDER DUE PROCESS 
The current law surrounding suggestive eyewitness identifications 
uses a due process analysis alone.60  The current law’s procedural due 
process view creates an inadequate rule largely because, if a court 
believes that an identification is correct, it will allow the identification 
into evidence, even if it is suggestive.  Not only have the Supreme 
Court’s protections of the 1960’s been dismantled and misinterpreted, 
but in light of today’s extensive research in the area of eyewitness 
identifications and human memory, the rules promulgated by the 
Supreme Court in the 1970’s do not, in fact, adequately safeguard 
against misidentifications and wrongful convictions. 
In the late 1960’s, the United States Supreme Court recognized 
that  defendants’ due process rights may be violated as a result of 
suggestive police eyewitness identification procedures.61  In 1967, the 
Supreme Court decided three cases involving eyewitness 
identification, often referred to as the “Wade Trilogy.”62  In United 
States v. Wade, the Court granted defendants the right to counsel at all 
post-indictment, live lineup eyewitness identification procedures.63  
The Court acknowledged the potential suggestive influence on a 
witness and the impact such evidence has on a defendant’s outcome at 
trial.64  Then, in Gilbert v. California, the Court addressed in-court 
identifications stemming from uncounseled out-of-court 
identifications.  It held that an in-court identification may be admitted 
if it can be shown that the identification is based upon the witness’s 
independent observation of the event and not the improper 
 
 60. See Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 99 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 196 
(1972) (noting that procedural due process governs pre-trial identification procedures). Cf. 
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 152 (1979) (suggesting that an alleged violation of procedural 
due process challenges the adequacy of procedures provided by the state or municipality in 
effecting the deprivation of liberty or property).  See generally 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constit. Law § 
901 (2007). 
 61. See Palmer v. Peyton, 359 F.2d 199, 202 (4th Cir. 1966). See also Stovall v. Denno, 388 
U.S. 293, 302 (1967) (finding that the defendant’s due process rights were not violated although 
the identification procedure was admittedly suggestive in that the suspect was brought to the 
hospital and was the only individual presented to the witness). 
 62. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); 
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). 
 63. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967) (“The vagaries of eyewitness 
identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken 
identification.”). 
 64. However, in United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 321 (1973), the Court declined to 
extend the defendants’ right to counsel to photographic lineups. 
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identification procedure.65  In the third case, Stovall v. Denno,66 the 
Supreme Court recognized the need to evaluate identification 
procedures by considering the “totality of the circumstances.”67  
Stovall requires that an identification be suppressed if it is “so 
unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable 
misidentification that [the accused] was denied due process of law.”68  
The Court held that although the show-up identification procedure 
was suggestive, it did not violate the defendant’s due process rights 
because of the police’s need for immediate action.69  The Court found 
that the show-up identification was imperative, given that the victim 
suffered potentially fatal wounds and was in jeopardy of imminent 
demise.70  The level of suggestion and the necessity of the use of the 
show-up were balanced against one another to result in the admission 
of the identification testimony.71  In Simmons v. United States, the 
Supreme Court declared that an identification procedure should be 
excluded only if “it was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a 
very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.”72  The 
Court in Simmons used the circumstances surrounding the event itself 
to assess the likelihood of irreparable misidentification.  The Simmons 
Court focused on whether the identification of the suspect was 
correct, rather than necessary.73 
In 1977, the United States Supreme Court announced in Manson 
v. Braithwaite that even if a lineup is suggestive, it could still be 
admitted into evidence if it is found to be “reliable.”74  Manson 
rejected the per se exclusion of suggestive identifications and held 
that suggestive identifications may still be admissible if they are found 
to be otherwise adequately reliable.75  This emphasis on reliability has 
led to the admission of eyewitness testimony stemming from highly 
suggestive identifications.  The Court declared a two-tier test for 
determining the admissibility of police eyewitness identifications and 
 
 65. See Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 272. 
 66. See Denno, 388 U.S. at 293. 
 67. See id. at 302. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968). 
 73. Id. at 385 (concluding that the circumstances “leave little room for doubt that the 
identification of Simmons was correct”). 
 74. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977). 
 75. Id. at 112–14. 
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courtroom identifications.  First, it must be determined whether the 
pre-trial identification was unnecessarily suggestive.76  If so, a court 
must ascertain whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the 
suggestive procedure gave rise to a substantial likelihood of 
irreparable misidentification.77  The Court concluded that in order to 
ascertain if there is a substantial likelihood of irreparable 
misidentification, there must be an assessment of the reliability of the 
initial identification.78  The Manson Court declared, “We therefore 
conclude that reliability is the linchpin in determining the 
admissibility of identification testimony. . . .”79  What the Court meant 
by “reliability” is that the surrounding circumstances provide strong 
indicia of the accuracy of the identification.  However, it is not 
realistic to try to formulate a test that attempts to assess the 
likelihood that a flawed lineup is correct.  If one could assess this, 
courts would admit identifications that identify the guilty and exclude 
misidentifications. 
The Court in Manson used the test established in its 1972 decision 
in Neil v. Biggers to determine when an identification procedure 
meets the test for reliability.80  The Biggers Court enumerated several 
factors to determine if a suggestive identification is reliable: (1) the 
witness’s opportunity to view the suspect; (2) the witness’s degree of 
attention; (3) the accuracy of description; (4) the witness’s level of 
certainty; and (5) the time between incident and confrontation, i.e., 
identification81 (hereinafter referred to as the Biggers factors).  In 
Biggers, the perpetrator grabbed the victim in a dimly lit area and 
raped her in a wooded area.  The victim testified she could see her 
assailant well because the moon was full.82  The Court found that 
these circumstances indicated a strong likelihood that the 
 
 76. Id. at 114. 
 77. Id. In Manson, an undercover police officer named Jimmy purchased narcotics from 
the seller and subsequently gave a description of the seller to another officer.  This other officer 
later left a single photograph of the defendant on Jimmy’s desk.  Jimmy identified the defendant 
as the seller. 
 78. Id. at 112. 
 79. Id. at 114. 
 80. In Neil v. Biggers, the Court determined the factors to be considered in deciding the 
reliability of a suggestive identification. 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972).  In Biggers, the Court admitted 
the identification of a suspect based upon the presentation of a single photograph to the witness.  
It held that although presentation of only one photograph might be suggestive, it did not give 
rise to substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 194. 
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identification was accurate and stemmed from the witness’s 
independent memory of the event.83 
Some courts include other corroborating evidence of guilt as a 
sixth factor to the enumerated five Biggers factors.84  The Second 
Circuit in particular recognizes the absurdity of using other 
corroborating evidence of guilt to support the introduction of 
eyewitness testimony into evidence.  The Second Circuit has written, 
“Even where there was irrefutable evidence of the defendant’s guilt, if 
an identification was made by a witness who, it transpired, was not 
even present at the event, we could hardly term the identification 
reliable.”85  On the contrary, the Seventh Circuit considers 
corroborating evidence of guilt when assessing the reliability of an 
identification procedure.  In United States ex rel. Kosik v. Napoli,86 the 
court found the identification reliable in part because the defendant 
was shown to have been driving the getaway car. 
Bobby Joe Leaster spent fifteen years in prison in large part due 
to corroborating evidence of guilt.87  According to Justice Marshall, 
“By importing the question of guilt into the initial determination of 
whether there was a constitutional violation, the apparent effect of 
the Court’s decision is to undermine the protection afforded by the 
Due Process Clause.”88  Consideration of evidence of guilt should only 
take place in harmless error reviews—not due process reviews.89 
The level of suggestion should be balanced against the reliability 
of the identification.  The Court in Manson stated, “Against these 
[Biggers] factors is to be weighed the corrupting effect of the 
suggestive identification itself.”90  Many courts fail to balance 
reliability against level of suggestion and admit suggestive 
identifications if the Biggers factors are met.91  These results are partly 
 
 83. Id. at 201. 
 84. Seven circuit courts disagree about whether this factor should be included. The First, 
Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits consider other evidence of guilt; while the Second, Third, 
and Fifth Circuits look to the reliability of the identification itself.  See Gambell, supra note 11. 
 85. Raheem v. Kelly, 257 F.3d 122, 140 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 86. 814 F.2d 1151, 1156–57, 1161 (7th Cir. 1987). 
 87. See Kenney, supra note 1. 
 88. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 128 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 89. See id. (stating that it is fundamentally unfair to use corroborating evidence of a 
defendant’s guilt in any due process violation, and such evaluations should only be done in 
harmless error reviews). 
 90. See Manson, 432 U.S. at 114. 
 91. See, e.g., United States v. Traeger, 289 F.3d 461, 474 (7th Cir. 2002).  The Seventh 
Circuit found a photographic array, in which the defendant was the only remarkably large 
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a consequence of courts’ struggles with the notion that nonetheless 
valid identifications may occur despite highly suggestive identification 
procedures.  Courts seem unable to create a rule consistent with the 
due process viewpoint that can adequately discourage police from 
employing suggestive procedures, protect the innocent from 
misidentifications, and allow correct identifications into evidence.92 
The due process reliability assessment that courts use today does 
not prevent irreparable misidentifications as it was intended to do.  
The Biggers factors do not provide a true indication of an accurate 
identification, because suggestion in the lineup significantly influences 
the reliability assessment.  The majority of the Biggers factors rely on 
self-reports of the witness.  However, self-reports of the witness are 
subject to the same witness’s distortions of memory and are 
influenced by the same suggestion present in the eyewitness 
identification procedure.  A court makes its reliability assessment 
subsequent to the lineup at a hearing on a defense motion to suppress 
eyewitness identification testimony.  A court generally evaluates the 
Biggers factors from the witness’s answers to questions at the hearing, 
well after the impact of the suggestive influence. 
It is paradoxical, but the more suggestive an identification 
procedure is, the more reliable a witness will appear.  For example, if 
an identifying witness is advised immediately after a lineup that she 
identified the suspect (suggestive “confirming feedback”), she will 
report a higher level of confidence in her identification.  This report of 
 
individual, to be admissible at trial.  The defendant was six feet five inches tall and weighed 350 
pounds.  Astonishingly, the court held that his lineup was not unduly suggestive.  Id.  The court 
went on to hold that even assuming that such a lineup was unduly suggestive it would 
nonetheless be admissible as meeting the Biggers factors for reliability.  Id.  The Sixth Circuit 
found a profoundly suggestive identification procedure to be admissible in Howard v. Bouchard, 
405 F.3d 459, 476 (6th Cir. 2005).  In Howard, the court concluded that a lineup where the 
witness viewed the defendant at the defense table with his lawyer one hour before the 
procedure was only “minimally suggestive.”  Id. at 470.  In Clark v. Caspari, 274 F.3d 507, 511–
12 (8th Cir. 2002), after an evaluation of the Biggers reliability factors, the Eighth Circuit 
admitted an identification (a show-up) where the witness viewed two African-American clerks 
surrounded by white police officers.  There are steps courts should take to motivate police 
agencies to institute procedures to minimize suggestion.  For example, police agencies could 
avoid blatant suggestion as occurred in Traeger with the creation of a national data bank with 
photographs of individuals to use in photographic lineups.  In this way, photographs that match 
the description of the suspect and witness’s description will be readily available to lineup 
administrators (even photographs of individuals with unusual characteristics). 
 92. Furthermore, the Manson and Biggers Courts did not consider the degree to which 
human memory is susceptible to police suggestive procedures.  See Ruth Yacona, Manson v. 
Brathwaite: The Supreme Court’s Misunderstanding of Eyewitness Identification, 39 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 539, 551 (2006). 
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confidence satisfies one of the Biggers factors and will indicate 
reliability of the identification to a court when, in truth, it may only be 
a reflection of the suggestion present in the lineup procedure.  In fact, 
suggestive identifications result in witnesses giving responses that 
indicate greater reliability of the identification on all five of the 
Biggers factors..93  This effect was demonstrated in an experiment in 
which witnesses were given confirming misinformation following a 
simulated identification where the culprit was not present.  Some 
participants were given the suggestive comment that they identified 
the right person, and others were told nothing.  The lineups were 
otherwise identical.  Of the participants who were not subject to the 
suggestion, only fifteen percent indicated later that they were certain 
they identified the right person, but fifty percent of the participants 
who were given the suggestive information reported identifying the 
right person.94  Furthermore, the participants who received the 
suggestive misinformation gave descriptions of the perpetrator that 
contained greater detail.95  These witnesses also reported having a 
better view of the perpetrator and observing the culprit for a longer 
period of time.  In other words, every Biggers factor improved in 
reliability under suggestive circumstances.  Accordingly, the presence 
of the Biggers factors does not significantly reduce the likelihood of 
misidentification. A Fourth Amendment perspective of suggestive 
eyewitness identifications presents alternative solutions. 
V.  LINEUPS UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
The significant risk of misidentification from eyewitness 
identifications requires protection under the Fourth Amendment.  
First, a compelled identification procedure is a seizure and triggers 
the Fourth Amendment.  Second, unregulated eyewitness 
identifications are prone to high levels of error and suggestion.  Both 
the physical invasion and the risk of misidentification of the lineup 
require Fourth Amendment consideration.  It is useful to examine 
how courts currently apply the Fourth Amendment to pre-arrest 
 
 93. Gary Wells, What is Wrong With the Manson v. Brathwaite Test of Eyewitness 
Identification Accuracy?, http://www.psychology.iastate.edu/faculty/gwells/Mansonproblem.pdf. 
 94. Amy L. Bradfield, Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, The Damaging Effect of 
Confirming Feedback on the Relation Between Eyewitness Certainty and Identification Accuracy, 
87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 116–18 (2002). 
 95. This is presumably from the participant’s observation of the individual in the lineup, 
not the individual in the event. 
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police investigatory procedures.  Ordinarily, a full seizure or arrest 
requires probable cause,96 which means that the facts are such that a 
prudent person would believe that a suspect has committed, is 
committing, or is about to commit a crime.97  When an individual’s 
freedom of movement is restricted, he or she has been seized under 
the Fourth Amendment.98  The Supreme Court wrote in Terry v. Ohio, 
“It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an 
individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has seized that 
person.”99  Courts agree that a physical lineup constitutes a seizure 
under the Fourth Amendment.100  The Fourth Amendment applies as 
fully to the investigatory stage as it does to arrest.101  As the Supreme 
Court recognized in Davis v. Mississippi, “Investigatory seizures 
would subject unlimited numbers of innocent persons to the 
harassment and ignominy incident to involuntary detention.”102 
There are exceptions to the general rule that probable cause is 
required prior to a search or seizure.  For example, as seen in Terry v. 
Ohio, officers may conduct investigatory stops of individuals on less 
than probable cause.103  In order for an officer to stop (or detain) an 
individual, even briefly, the officer must have specific and articulable 
facts that reasonably warrant such an intrusion.104  An investigatory 
stop, or “Terry stop,” which requires reasonable or founded suspicion, 
exists when a reasonable person would feel that the person’s right to 
move has been restricted.105  Founded or reasonable suspicion is 
defined as “a particularized and objective basis, supported by specific 
and articulable facts, for suspecting a person of criminal activity.”106  
Further, the law permits police to conduct a somewhat more intrusive 
privacy invasion under certain circumstances in the absence of 
probable cause when the officer has reasonable grounds to believe 
that the suspect may be armed.107  In this circumstance, a limited 
 
 96. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 n.12 (1968). 
 97. United States v. Puerta, 982 F.2d 1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. 
Thomas, 835 F.2d 219, 222 (9th Cir. 1987)). 
 98. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 16. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See In re Armed Robbery, 659 P.2d 1092, 1094 (Wash. 1983) (en banc). 
 101. See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726 (1969). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16–17. 
 104. Id. at 21. 
 105. State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 510–11 (N.J. 2003) (quoting State v. Rodriguez, 172 N.J. 
117, 126  (N.J. 2002) and Terry, 392 U.S. at 21). 
 106. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1487 (8th ed. 2004). 
 107. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 16. 
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“frisk” on the outer clothing is permissible for officer safety only.108  
The Court has reaffirmed that the probable-cause exception from 
Terry should be narrowly applied, noting that “[b]ecause Terry 
involved an exception to the general rule requiring probable cause, 
the Court has been careful to maintain its narrow scope.”109 
Some police–citizen encounters are permissible in the absence of 
any police suspicion of criminal activity.  These include circumstances 
in which courts find that the citizen was free to leave and thereby not 
“seized” within the purview of the Fourth Amendment.  Situations 
where the citizen is free to leave are often called “consensual 
encounters,” implying that the citizen has given consent and that the 
citizen has no objection to the interaction with the police.  However, 
in the majority of these situations, the police initiate the interaction.  
In many cases, consensual encounters escalate into limited seizures.  
In these situations, the legality of the stop is often an issue on 
appeal.110 
Another form of police–citizen encounter requiring no suspicion 
of criminal activity is termed “community caretaking.”111  In these 
situations, police officers are performing duties consistent with civil 
emergencies or a citizen’s personal crisis such as assisting in locating a 
lost child.  For example, in State v. Chisholm,112 an unmarked police car 
noticed a citizen had driven away with his hat still placed on his car 
and thus radioed a police car to help the citizen “save” his hat.  Upon 
stopping the car to inform the citizen about his hat, the officer 
observed contraband between the passenger and the driver.  The 
officer then arrested and charged the occupants.  Thus, a citizen was 
seized and an arrest was legally accomplished without either probable 
cause or reasonable suspicion during a community caretaking activity. 
Courts have found other non-testimonial investigatory searches 
and seizures to require less than probable cause.  In Davis v. 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210 (1979). 
 110. See Golphin v. State, 838 So. 2d 705 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (applying a “totality of 
the circumstances test” to conclude that temporary retention of a suspect’s license was not a 
seizure when the suspect handed it over voluntarily); Piggot v. Commonwealth, 537 S.E.2d 618, 
619 (Va. Ct. App. 2000) (“By retaining Piggot’s identification, [the officer] implicitly 
commanded [him] to stay.”); State v. Thomas, 955 P.2d 420, 423 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (“Once 
an officer retains the suspect’s identification or driver’s license and takes it with him to conduct 
a warrants check, a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment has occurred.”). 
 111. Cady v. Dombroski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973). 
 112. State v. Chisholm, 696 P.2d 41, 42 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985). 
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Mississippi, the Supreme Court found that, although the taking of 
fingerprints is no less subject to the constraints of the Fourth 
Amendment than other detentions, police may compel fingerprints in 
the absence of probable cause under certain specific circumstances.113  
The Court rationalized that the taking of fingerprints constitutes a 
less serious intrusion on personal liberty than other types of police 
searches and detentions.  Saliva-swabbing for DNA testing does not 
require probable cause for comparable reasons.114  Some states have 
enacted statutory guidelines for seeking “Nontestimonial 
Identification Orders” (“NTOs”).  These rules define when officers 
may conduct certain investigatory searches and seizures such as DNA 
testing and fingerprinting.  These NTOs generally mandate a showing 
of reasonable grounds to suspect that the person (suspect) committed 
the crime in question.115  Courts, legislatures, and police agencies take 
very seriously pre-arrest investigatory intrusions under the Fourth 
Amendment, going as far as to seek court orders for such intrusions. 
In 1971, the Second Circuit, in Biehunik v. Feliceta, specifically 
held that placing an individual in a lineup constitutes a seizure under 
the Fourth Amendment.116  In Biehunik, the lower court issued an 
injunction preventing the appearance of sixty-two police officers in 
lineups because such compelled appearance constituted a “seizure” in 
the absence of a warrant or probable cause.117  There was no basis to 
believe that all sixty-two officers had committed a crime.  Biehunik 
held that probable cause was not necessary to compel the appearance 
of the officers in the lineups in part due to their roles as police 
officers.118  The court reached this conclusion using the test announced 
 
 113. See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727–28 (1969). 
 114. Bousman v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Clinton County, 630 N.W.2d 789, 798 (Iowa 2001). 
 115. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 810.6 (West 2007).  See also VT. R. CRIM. P. 41.1 
(providing the authority for obtaining an NTO and requiring: (1) that there is probable cause to 
believe that an offense has been committed; (2) that there are reasonable grounds to suspect, or, 
in circumstances where constitutionally required, probable cause to believe, that the person 
named or described in the affidavit committed the offense; and (3) that the results of the specific 
nontestimonial identification procedures will be of material aid in determining whether the 
person named in the affidavit committed the offense). 
 116. See Biehunik v. Felicetta, 441 F.2d 228, 230 (2d Cir. 1971).  This writer’s research 
revealed very little law specifically indicating the Fourth Amendment status of the suspect 
during a lineup.  Biehunik explicitly denoted that the suspect is seized during a lineup for Fourth 
Amendment purposes.  Other cases simply considered the issue while implying or assuming the 
suspect was detained or seized for Fourth Amendment purposes.  See id. (“A trustworthy police 
force is a precondition of minimal social stability in our imperfect society. . . .”). 
 117. Id. at 229. 
 118. Id. at 230. 
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by the Supreme Court in Camara v. Municipal Court, finding that the 
governmental interest in the particular intrusion must be weighed 
against the offense to the individual’s personal dignity and integrity.119  
The court in Biehunik found that the substantial public interest in 
ensuring police integrity outweighed the individual officer’s privacy 
interests.120  In Biehunik, police officers were compelled to submit to a 
lineup in the absence of any suspicion of criminal activity.  
Accordingly, what level of suspicion that a civilian has committed a 
crime should exist before requiring the civilian’s appearance in a 
lineup?  Biehunik indicates that an individual who is not a public 
official would require probable cause before a compelled appearance 
in a lineup.  Yet, it seems extreme to hold that a civilian may not be 
placed in a lineup without probable cause, but a police officer may be 
compelled to participate in a lineup absent any suspicion of criminal 
activity whatsoever.121  The Supreme Court of Washington has held 
that an individual may not be ordered to participate in a lineup where 
no probable cause exists to believe that the individual has committed 
the offense under investigation.122  On the other hand, the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the compelled 
appearance of an individual in a lineup on less than probable cause.123  
Neither court considered the risk of bias and error associated with 
lineups as relevant to the Fourth Amendment inquiry. 
Courts generally equate the level of physical intrusion to the 
individual with the level of Fourth Amendment protection.  Should 
the unusual risk associated with participation in a lineup provide the 
suspect with heightened Fourth Amendment protections?  A simple 
look at the plain language of the Fourth Amendment provides 
guidance.  The Fourth Amendment provides that “the right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. . . 
.”124  The appropriate question pursuant to the language of the 
Amendment is: Is the seizure reasonable?  With regard to 
 
 119. See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534–37 (1967) (using the terminology of 
“personal security” and “privacy” to describe the individual’s rights in its balancing test). 
 120. See Biehunik, 441 F.2d at 230–31. 
 121. In part, this is why this Article proposes a specified suspicion standard that is more than 
founded suspicion but less than probable cause before compelling an individual’s appearance in 
a lineup. 
 122. See In re Armed Robbery, 659 P.2d 1092, 1094–95 (Wash. 1983) (en banc). 
 123. Wise v. Murphy, 275 A.2d 205, 212–15 (D.C. 1971). 
 124. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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unregulated identifications, the answer hinges on whether the 
reliability associated with an investigatory procedure is relevant to 
determine its reasonableness as a seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment.  Eyewitness identification procedures are unusually 
unreliable.  In fact, one finds it difficult to think of a pre-trial 
investigatory procedure less reliable.125  Some jurisdictions are 
adopting procedural guidelines for the implementation of eyewitness 
identification, but these rules are not accompanied by any threat of 
exclusion in court to encourage their use by the police.126  
Misidentifications are the leading cause of wrongful convictions.127  It 
follows that a significantly unreliable investigatory police procedure 
that may lead to misidentification and even wrongful conviction is 
unreasonable.  Because an unregulated lineup is unreliable, and thus 
unreasonable, in light of its status as a seizure, such a lineup seems on 
its face to violate the Fourth Amendment. 
However, simply looking at the plain language of the Fourth 
Amendment may not end the inquiry.  Courts interpret 
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment in terms of the level of 
intrusion.128  As the Supreme Court stated in 1967 in Camara v. 
Municipal Court, “[T]here is no ready test for determining 
reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search (or seize) 
against the invasion which the search (or seizure) entails.”129  It may 
not be possible to proclaim that a seizure is unfair and therefore 
unreasonable through a mere review of the language of the Fourth 
Amendment.  What factors do courts consider in evaluating the 
reasonableness of a seizure?  Reasonableness involves balancing 
 
 125. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966).  Police interrogations are also 
susceptible to suggestion and police coercion, and courts have responded to this lack of 
reliability with constitutional protection, i.e. “Miranda warnings.” 
 126. STATE OF N.J. DEP’T OF LAW AND PUBLIC SAFETY ON ATTORNEY GENERAL 
GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING AND CONDUCTING PHOTO AND LIVE LINEUP IDENTIFICATION 
PROCEDURES (Apr. 18, 2001), at http://www.psychology.iastate.edu/FACULTY/gwells/ 
njguidelines.pdf; U.S DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT (Oct. 1999), at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/178240.pdf); CAL. COMM’N ON 
THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION REGARDING EYEWITNESS 
IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES (Apr. 13, 2006), at http://www.psychology.iastate.edu/faculty/ 
gwells/California_Commission.pdf); WIS. ATT’Y GEN. OFFICE, REPORT ON MODEL POLICE 
AND PROCEDURE FOR EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION (Sept. 12, 2005), at 
http://www.thejusticeproject.org/press/reports/pdfs/Eyewitness Public.pdf . 
 127. See Gross et al., supra note 15. 
 128. See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534–37 (1967). 
 129. Id. at 536–37. 
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governmental interest against the intrusion.130  Not only does an 
unregulated lineup involve an increased intrusion to the individual 
resulting from the risk of misidentification, but there is also a 
powerful governmental interest in protecting citizens from 
misidentification.  Indeed, courts have linked Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness to the reliability or trustworthiness of an investigatory 
procedure.  In Davis v. Mississippi, the Court compared a detention 
for purposes of obtaining fingerprints to one for lineup purposes.  
Holding that probable cause was not necessary to detain the 
defendant for fingerprinting, the Court noted that fingerprinting is a 
more reliable investigatory procedure than eyewitness identifications: 
Furthermore, fingerprinting is an inherently more reliable and 
effective crime-solving tool than eyewitness identifications or 
confessions and is not subject to such abuses as the improper line-
up and the ‘third-degree.’131 
Therefore, at least in part because fingerprinting is more reliable and 
effective than eyewitness identifications, the Court found that less 
than probable cause was required.  This supports the conclusion that 
the less reliable or effective an investigatory procedure is, the greater 
the Fourth Amendment concerns. 
Courts subsequently have found the lack of reliability in an 
investigatory procedure to trigger heightened Fourth Amendment 
protections.  In 1983, in State v. Hall, the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey held that only lineup procedures comparable in reliability to 
fingerprinting may be sustainable on less than probable cause.132  The 
court, referring to language in Davis, stated: 
A detention for fingerprinting was also regarded as essentially a 
reliable, simple and expeditious proceeding that could be 
conducted fairly and without palpable abuse.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that those identification procedures that are comparable 
to fingerprinting will be sustainable upon a showing of less than 
probable cause.133 
The court in Hall proclaimed that lineups could be reliable and 
effective, thereby requiring less than probable cause, when conducted 
 
 130. Id. 
 131. See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969). 
 132. State v. Hall, 461 A.2d 1155 (N.J. 1983). 
 133. Id. at 1161 (internal citations omitted). 
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properly and fairly.134  The court did not specify how police agencies 
should be expected to assure that a lineup procedure be comparable 
to fingerprinting.  With scientific knowledge about the bias and error 
associated with eyewitness identifications, procedural guidelines are 
the most rational means to achieve more reliable identification 
procedures.  Hall holds explicitly that the level of prejudice toward 
the suspect affects whether or not an intrusion is improper for Fourth 
Amendment purposes.  The fairness of the procedure and risk of error 
are directly connected to the level of intrusion for Fourth 
Amendment purposes.135  The Hall court stated: 
Indeed, the Supreme Court in Davis observed that ‘abuses’ can 
occur in an investigatory detention, mentioning specifically an 
‘improper lineup.’  As a result, in order to guarantee that the 
detention and accompanying intrusion is not improper or abusive, 
it must be accomplished in a fashion designed to produce the least 
amount of harassment of, interference with, or prejudice to the 
suspect.136 
In many circumstances, the level of physical intrusion on an 
individual involved with an identification procedure may not be much 
greater than that required for a fingerprint or an investigatory 
detention.  The level of physical intrusion varies widely in eyewitness 
identifications.  It ranges from a very brief “show-up”137 on the street 
to a live lineup at the police station requiring considerable time and 
effort on the part of the detainee.  In fact, application of procedural 
safeguards will often result in a greater physical intrusion to the 
individual.  The application of the guidelines proposed in this Article 
will necessarily increase the level of physical intrusiveness involved in 
any compelled eyewitness identification procedure.  For example, it 
will require that the suspect be detained a longer period of time while 
a blind administrator and appropriate fillers are located.  Does the 
Fourth Amendment permit or even require a greater physical 
intrusion to the person’s body to protect him or her from the potential 
of some greater harm via misidentification?  Given the frequency of 
 
 134. See id. at 1160–62. 
 135. See Bousman v. Iowa Dist. Court for Clinton County, 630 N.W.2d 789, 798 (Iowa 2001) 
(finding that less than probable cause is necessary for DNA testing in part because it is a valid 
investigatory technique). 
 136. State v. Hall, 461 A.2d 1155, 1162 (N.J. 1983) (quoting Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 
721, 727 (1969)). 
 137. A show-up identification is characterized by the witness being presented with only one 
suspect for possible identification; no fillers are included.  See supra note 13. 
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misidentifications and wrongful convictions, this potential harm is one 
that should be of serious governmental and public interest. 
Courts have long recognized the risk of suggestion and prejudice 
in eyewitness identifications.138  Yet, courts evaluate whether or not 
suggestive eyewitness identifications are constitutional solely through 
a due process analysis.139  This due process perspective has failed to 
protect citizens from an unreasonable risk of misidentification.  The 
law will most effectively protect citizens from the dangers of 
unregulated eyewitness identifications if courts recognize that the 
risks involved with lineups trigger heightened Fourth Amendment 
protections.  The Fourth Amendment provides more specific 
protections than does a due process evaluation and, consequently, 
courts must consider the Fourth Amendment first.  As the Supreme 
Court wrote in Albright v. Oliver, “Substantive due process should be 
reserved for otherwise homeless substantial claims, and should not be 
relied on when doing so will duplicate protection that a more specific 
constitutional provision already bestows.”140 
A Fourth Amendment analysis of unfairly suggestive eyewitness 
identification procedures will necessarily result in the exclusion of the 
identification testimony at trial.  The current law’s insistence on 
analyzing suggestive identifications through a due process lens creates 
an inadequate rule largely because, if courts believe a suggestive 
identification is nonetheless correct, they allow the identification into 
evidence.  A Fourth Amendment consideration of an identification 
procedure should not assess whether or not the identification was, in 
fact, accurate despite the lineup’s lack of fairness.  For example, when 
a court determines whether the search of a defendant that located 
cocaine in the defendant’s pocket was an unreasonable search under 
the Fourth Amendment, the court will not consider whether the 
substance was, in fact, cocaine.  If the search was unreasonable, the 
court will exclude the drugs from evidence.  In this example, there is 
no question that the individual was actually guilty.141 But in the 
interest of regulating police conduct and protecting innocent citizens, 
the exclusionary rule applies.  Otherwise, courts have no power to 
protect citizens from police misconduct. 
 
 138. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 229, 236 (1967). 
 139. See Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 106 (1977). 
 140. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 267 (1994). 
 141. Excluding, of course, situations in which the police may have planted the evidence on 
the defendant or where laboratory tests later reveal that the substance in question is not illegal. 
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Similarly, without excluding identification testimony resulting 
from unregulated identification procedures, courts lack any authority 
to encourage implementation of safeguards to protect the innocent 
against misidentifications resulting from suggestive identification 
procedures.  The deterrence of abusive or unfair police conduct is a 
vital role of the exclusionary rule, especially when stemming from 
Fourth Amendment violations.  The Supreme Court noted: “Ever 
since its inception, the rule excluding evidence seized in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment has been recognized as a principal mode of 
discouraging lawless police conduct.”142  Cases founded on due 
process claims are void of any discussion of the goal of deterrence of 
police misconduct via the exclusionary rule.143  Courts’ only authority 
to protect citizens from invasions of their liberty is through the 
exclusionary rule, as courts are otherwise powerless to influence or 
regulate police procedures.  The exclusionary rule, as it applies to the 
Fourth Amendment, contains “remedial objectives,” and courts have 
found that it applies only where the objective of deterrence can be 
furthered.144 
Police often create bias and unfair identification procedures 
unwittingly.  One could argue that the exclusionary rule cannot deter 
inadvertent conduct.  However, it would be intellectually dishonest 
for a police agency to assert that it did not know that inadvertent 
influences on witnesses are commonplace in the absence of 
procedural safeguards.  In other words, police know that regulating 
lineups is good police practice and that failure to regulate a lineup 
puts the suspect in jeopardy of misidentification.  Failure to use 
specific procedural standards is not accidental.  Further, “[g]ood faith 
is not a magic lamp for police officers to rub whenever they find 
themselves in trouble.”145  Courts should apply the exclusionary rule if 
it can reasonably be said to instill a “greater degree of care”146 in 
officers in future investigations.  The judiciary should not be less 
concerned with regulating police conduct in an eyewitness 
identification procedure than in more traditional searches and 
 
 142. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968). 
 143. My research did not locate any discussion of the exclusionary rule as it applies to due 
process claims and the goal of deterring police misconduct. 
 144. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908 (1984) (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 
U.S. 338, 348 (1974)). 
 145. State v. Reilly, 76 F.3d 1271, 1280 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 146. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974). 
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seizures.147  Police conduct surrounding identification procedures 
requires regulation and judicial enforcement. 
Courts should apply the exclusionary rule where the benefits of 
deterrence outweigh the social costs.148  The potential social cost of 
applying the exclusionary rule to eyewitness identification testimony 
would be the inadmissibility of eyewitness testimony from one 
government witness.  In some circumstances, the government may be 
unable to proceed with the charges.  In many other cases, the 
prosecution will be capable of proceeding to trial with other 
identification testimony and other incriminating evidence, albeit with 
a weaker case.  The social cost is exceedingly low when balanced 
against the conviction of an innocent person.  The social cost from the 
application of the exclusionary rule in other Fourth Amendment 
violations involves the exclusion of unquestionably valid evidence.  
For example, when an illegal, warrantless search reveals drugs, a trial 
court will suppress the drugs.  On the other hand, the social cost of 
excluding eyewitness testimony stemming from unregulated 
identification procedures includes the significant likelihood that the 
court is excluding invalid evidence.  Therefore, application of the 
exclusionary rule to eyewitness testimony protects innocent citizens. 
The benefit of applying the exclusionary rule to identification 
procedures is that it protects the innocent from wrongful conviction.  
This prospect is not speculative conjecture but rather a concrete 
reality, because faulty eyewitness identifications account for more 
wrongful convictions than all other causes combined.149  This benefit 
far outweighs the social cost.  A vital distinction between lineups and 
other police procedures triggering the Fourth Amendment is, in 
eyewitness identifications, innocent citizens may be arrested due to 
police misconduct.  Police will not ordinarily arrest innocent citizens 
who are subject to other Fourth Amendment violations stemming 
from police misconduct,150 precisely because the police will not 
 
 147. Leon, 468 U.S. at 906–07.  Although the Leon Court refused to exercise the 
exclusionary rule if the police were exhibiting “good faith” when searching and securing 
evidence, the Court clarified that this “good faith” exception would be appropriate only with 
“reliable physical evidence,” which does not include eyewitness identifications.  Id. at 912–13. 
 148. For example, in Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006), the Supreme Court found 
that violations of the knock and announce rule do not require application of the exclusionary 
rule.  The Court held that the social cost of suppression of the evidence outweighed the benefits 
of deterring police non-compliance with the knock and announce rule. 
 149. See Gross et al., supra note 15, at 542. 
 150. Examples of other police misconduct include violations of the knock and announce 
rule, lack of probable cause or founded suspicion, and failure to obtain a warrant. 
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discover any condemning evidence.  The societal interest in regulating 
police conduct for the majority of other Fourth Amendment 
violations is to protect the innocent citizen’s personal dignity and 
privacy.  Conversely, a suggestive or unregulated lineup may produce 
damning but false eyewitness testimony that could result in the arrest 
and even conviction of an innocent citizen.  The innocent citizen has 
more to lose as a result of police misconduct during a lineup than 
suffering mere embarrassment or personal indignities.  The Biggers 
“reliability” assessment used by the courts is unsuccessful in 
determining a correct identification from an incorrect one.  
Accordingly, current law does not accurately recognize 
misidentifications and exclude them from evidence at trial, placing 
citizens in great jeopardy.  Application of procedural safeguards will 
facilitate the identification of the truly guilty by helping to ensure that 
the witness has identified the suspect from her independent 
recollection of the event.  Therefore, to apply a per se rule of 
exclusion for unregulated lineups is a unique application of the 
exclusionary rule, because it protects the innocent as well as 
encourages the arrest and conviction of the guilty.151 
Identification procedures are a particularly fertile soil for police–
citizen misunderstanding, police mischief, and citizen risk.  Jerome H. 
Skolnick asks, “To what extent if at all is it proper for law 
enforcement officials to employ trickery and deceit as part of their 
law enforcement practices?”152  He continues, “The reality is: 
Deception is considered by police—and the courts as well—to be as 
natural to detecting as pouncing is to a cat.”153  Indeed, deception may 
be a part of all aspects of police work from arrest to trial, but Skolnick 
states that the area where deception is most prevalent is in the 
investigatory stages.  A quote from Justice Without Trial is appropriate 
here: “The policeman operates as one whose aim is to legitimize the 
evidence pertaining to a case, rather than as a jurist whose goal is to 
analyze the sufficiency of the evidence based on case law.”154  In short, 
Skolnick states that the police are “routinely permitted and advised to 
 
 151. Application of guidelines for lineups will serve the social mission of facilitating 
conviction of the guilty as well.  Eyewitness testimony stemming from proper lineups with 
adequate safeguards will result in more frequent identifications of the guilty and stronger 
evidence at trial. 
 152. Jerome H. Skolnick, Deception by Police, 1(2) CRIM. JUSTICE ETHICS 40 (Summer/Fall 
1982). 
 153. Id. at 40. 
 154. Id. at 43 (quoting JEROME SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 214 (2d. ed. 1975)). 
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employ deceptive techniques and strategies in the investigative 
process.”155  Consequently, Fourth Amendment analysis of 
unregulated identification procedures is crucial to the fair 
administration of justice, because under the Fourth Amendment, 
courts may regulate police behavior and implement consequences for 
failure of police to use adequate procedural safeguards. 
Like their treatment of coerced confessions, courts should 
suppress identification testimony stemming from a biased or unfair 
procedure.  Courts agree that the use of a coerced confession against 
a defendant denies the defendant due process of law no matter how 
strong the other evidence against him at trial,156 because the violated 
right is so fundamental.  The similarities between a coerced confession 
and an unregulated identification procedure are obvious.157  Both 
outcomes rely on the functioning of the human mind.  Both 
procedures may be highly influenced by suggestion and psychological 
influence of police officers.  Both types of evidence are persuasive to 
juries to convict.  Both procedures may result in erroneous outcomes 
by both purposeful as well as inadvertent police behavior.  Citizens 
placed in identification procedures merit protections similar to those 
individuals subjected to interrogations.  Consequently, under a Fourth 
Amendment analysis, courts should suppress an identification 
stemming from an unreasonable suggestive identification seizure 
regardless of the culpability of the suspect. 
According to Justice Brennan, “Nothing is more clear than that 
the Fourth Amendment was meant to prevent wholesale intrusions 
upon the personal security of our citizenry, whether these intrusions 
be termed ‘arrests’ or ‘investigatory detentions.’”158  How can one 
sensibly assert that unregulated, suggestive identification procedures 
do not invade and threaten an individual’s personal security?  
Certainly, criminal accusation, jail, prosecution, and even wrongful 
conviction are among the most profound invasions of personal 
 
 155. Id. at 45. 
 156. See Payne v. State of Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958); see also Chapman v. California, 
386 U.S. 18, 43 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“When involuntary confessions have been 
introduced at trial, the Court has always reversed convictions regardless of other evidence of 
guilt.”). 
 157. There is one notable difference between the exclusionary rule as it applies to Fourth 
Amendment as opposed to Fifth Amendment violations.  The Self-Incrimination Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment contains its own self-executing exclusionary rule.  Conversely, Fourth 
Amendment remedies are judicially imposed sanctions and are not derived from the text of the 
amendment itself. See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 640 (2004). 
 158. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726–27 (1969). 
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security.159  To say that the mere risk of these personal security 
invasions does not equate to an increased privacy concern would be 
intellectually short-sighted—as if to say that one only needs to wear a 
parachute after jumping out of the plane, not to don it while still on 
board.  Once you are falling, you cannot put on the parachute.  Once a 
misidentification has occurred, arrest and prosecution are imminent.  
It is too late for Fourth Amendment protections, and the wrongly 
accused is assured of suffering tremendous invasions of personal 
security that will affect the rest of the accused’s life.  To protect 
citizens from such invasions, the protections must be implemented 
prior to the eyewitness identification procedure itself. 
VI.  PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS 
A. Specific Suspicion of Criminal Activity Required for Appearance 
in a Lineup 
The Fourth Amendment does not provide a uniform legal 
criterion through which officers may compel an individual to 
participate in a lineup.  Placing an individual in a lineup exposes him 
or her to substantial risk.  The reality of everyday police work is that 
police routinely present individuals to victims and witnesses on the 
street for identification in the absence of any procedural safeguards.160  
Placing an individual in a lineup is a greater privacy intrusion for 
Fourth Amendment purposes than an “investigatory stop” but is less 
of an intrusion than arrest.  Police frequently seek probable cause for 
arrest through eyewitness identification procedures.  To require 
probable cause prior to an identification procedure may unfairly tie 
the officer’s hands—it may require the officer to forego the 
apprehension of an unreasonable number of guilty individuals due to 
lack of probable cause for arrest.  Consequently, this Article proposes 
 
 159. A person’s right to privacy is also protected under Article 12 of the United Nations 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states, “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary 
interference with his privacy, family, home, or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour 
and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or 
attacks.”  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, Art. 12, U.N. GAOR, 3d 
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).  United Nations member countries are 
morally, if not legally, bound by such declarations.  Certainly, misidentification qualifies as an 
attack upon honor or reputation.  The very real threat of misidentification that accompanies an 
unregulated identification procedure requires legal protection under this provision. 
 160. This statement is based on interviews with multiple criminal defense attorneys and 
public defenders in Miami, Florida. 
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a new legal standard that will reasonably restrict which individuals 
may be placed as suspects in any identification procedures.161  Police 
would have to meet this new legal criterion before they could compel 
an individual’s appearance in a lineup.  It is reasonable and desirable 
to propose a straightforward standard for identification procedures 
that would be similar to the current “reasonable suspicion” standard 
(i.e., Terry stop) but with the addition of a particularized wrongdoing 
component.162  Under this proposed standard, the language to define 
the grounds for placing an individual in an identification procedure 
would nearly mirror the standard for investigatory detentions.  It 
would state: 
An individual may be placed in an identification procedure only if 
the officer has a particularized suspicion based upon an objective 
observation that the person being placed in the procedure has been 
engaged in the specific criminal wrongdoing observed by the 
witness. 
Should the government fail to meet the burden of proving that the 
officer possessed this level of suspicion prior to compelling an 
individual’s attendance at a lineup, the trial court should exclude the 
identification.  This standard would not differ from the current 
standard required for an investigatory stop, other than that the officer 
must have specific and articulable facts to reasonably believe that the 
suspect was in fact the culprit of the specific crime observed by the 
witness, as opposed to some generalized, unidentified wrongdoing.  
Application of such a standard is practical and understandable, and 
will diminish the peril in which a suspect is placed pursuant to even 
the most regulated lineup procedure. 
B. Guidelines to Reduce Suggestion in Eyewitness Identification 
Procedures 
Effective eyewitnesses identification warrants specific procedural 
guidelines to minimize suggestion and bias in the lineup.  State v. Hall 
suggests that identification procedures predicated on less than 
 
 161. See Wells, supra note 27, at 635–36, for an example of a similar standard.  Gary Wells 
proposes a criterion that officers must have reasonable suspicion before placing an individual in 
a lineup.  Wells does not suggest an exact definition of “reasonable suspicion,” noting that it is a 
policy definition, not a scientific one.  However, Wells states that it should be less than probable 
cause.  Id. 
 162. A mere investigatory detention is acceptable whether or not the officer can identify the 
specific crime or wrongdoing in which the individual might have been engaged. 
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probable cause be admissible only if they are equivalent in reliability 
to fingerprinting.163  Eyewitness identifications may never be as 
reliable as a scientific procedure like fingerprinting.  Yet, 
implementing specific procedural guidelines that minimize prejudice 
and error will make identification procedures more reliable.  Only if 
such guidelines accompany a lineup should a court sustain the lineup 
on less than probable cause under the Fourth Amendment.164  
Accordingly, this Article suggests nine specific guidelines to protect 
innocent citizens from misidentification for use during an 
identification procedure.165  These guidelines include the use of blind 
administrators and a sufficient number of fillers who may each 
reasonably resemble the suspect.166  Adopting mandatory procedures 
for eyewitness identifications is the most significant step police could 
take to reduce wrongful convictions.167  As reflected in Davis, the 
reliability of police investigatory procedures triggers Fourth 
Amendment concerns.168  Therefore, guidelines that maximize the 
reliability of lineups are important under the Fourth Amendment. 
 
 163. See State v. Hall, 461 A.2d 1155, 1161 (N.J. 1983) 
 164. A Fourth Amendment analysis in no way negates the necessity for a due process 
inquiry.  For example, although the existence of probable cause may not trigger the requirement 
for use of the guidelines under the Fourth Amendment, the lack of the use of guidelines may 
result in impermissible suggestion under a due process inquiry. 
 165. See Sarah Anne Mourer, Prophylactic Guidelines for Florida Eyewitness Identifications 
(on file with author). 
 166. Id.  The following guidelines are suggested: 
1. The lineup must be double blind.  
2. The lineup must contain a minimum of five fillers. 
3. The suspect must not stand out in the lineup. 
4. The fillers must reasonably resemble either the suspect or the witness’s description of 
the perpetrator. 
5. Only one suspect must be included in the lineup. 
6. The same fillers should not be reused when showing multiple lineups with different 
suspects to the same witness. 
7. If the lineup is photographic: 
a. Select a photograph of the suspect that resembles the suspect’s appearance 
or description at the time of the incident. 
b. Ensure that no writing or information on the photographs is visible to the 
witness. 
c. Preserve the photo array in the same condition as it was shown to the 
witness. 
8. The lineup administrator must record both identification and/or non-identification 
results in writing. 
9. A written statement of confidence must be taken from the witness immediately 
following an identification. 
 167. Id. 
 168. See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969). 
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The Fourth Amendment requires two steps to protect a suspect 
from an unfair and unreliable lineup procedure.  First, police must 
have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity prior to conducting a 
lineup.  Second, the lineup as conducted must continue to be 
reasonable in accordance with the Fourth Amendment.  In fact, a 
lineup seizure may be viewed as a series of steps, each requiring 
Fourth Amendment protections.  Generally, a suspect will first be 
detained requiring founded suspicion of criminal activity.  Then, if the 
police obtain a heightened degree of specified founded suspicion, they 
may order the suspect to participate in a lineup.  Lastly, as the lineup 
occurs and the suspect is actually exposed to the risk of 
misidentification, procedural guidelines are necessary under the 
Fourth Amendment.  During all three phases of this police 
investigatory procedure, the citizen is placed in different and 
increasing levels of risk and intrusion under the Fourth Amendment.  
Consequently, each phase of the lineup investigatory procedure 
requires safeguards.  Under a Fourth Amendment analysis, failure to 
use proper procedural guidelines in a pre-arrest compelled eyewitness 
identification procedure would result in exclusion of the identification 
testimony at trial.169 
VII.  EXCEPTIONS 
The use of safeguards proposed in Section VI has two types of 
exceptions: (1) those identification procedures that do not trigger the 
Fourth Amendment, and (2) those that are “reasonable” under the 
Fourth Amendment without the safeguards.  First, only a compelled 
appearance in a lineup would be considered a seizure thereby 
implicating Fourth Amendment concerns.  One is not seized if he or 
she is free to leave.170  Thus, giving consent to participate in a lineup 
would waive these procedural requirements because the police would 
not have seized the individual.  Consent is a tricky issue when it 
comes to police–citizen encounters.  When does a citizen know that he 
or she is free to refuse?171  As noted earlier, “consensual police 
 
 169. Due process also requires the implementation of the above guidelines.  This is a topic 
for a future article. 
 170. See United States v. Terry, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968); see also United States v. Mendenhall, 
446 U.S. 544, 553–54 (1980). 
 171. This scenario brings to mind Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and raises an 
inquiry as to whether officers should be required to advise citizens that they have the right to 
refuse to participate in a lineup in the absence of the procedural safeguards. 
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encounters” do not require any level of suspicion and do not trigger 
the Fourth Amendment.  Bear in mind that officers do not (the vast 
majority of the time) ask the citizen for permission to approach prior 
to making the request for a driver’s license, to participate in a lineup, 
or for other information.  If the government intends to use consent as 
an exception its burden should be great.172  The prosecution should be 
required to show that the consent was, in fact, informed.  This would 
include informing the suspect of: (1) the right not to consent; (2) the 
risks of misidentification in an unregulated lineup or show-up; and (3) 
what rights the suspect is giving up, including the specific guidelines 
and level of suspicion normally required.  The most expeditious and 
thorough procedure for obtaining such consent would be via a waiver 
form that officers could carry with them for the suspect to sign.  This 
Article does not intend to advocate revamping the entire body of law 
regarding the police obligation to inform citizens of their right to 
refuse to a search.  Currently, the police have no obligation to do so.173  
However, in the typical search and seizure, the innocent citizen has 
nothing to fear past embarrassment and inconvenience.  The innocent 
citizen invited to participate in a lineup should fear misidentification 
and even wrongful conviction.  One can easily imagine a scenario in 
which an innocent citizen would prefer to consent to a show-up on the 
street as opposed to a drive to the station to wait for a proper lineup.  
Yet, one can also easily surmise that this innocent citizen is 
completely unaware of the risk she is taking by participating in the 
show-up.  Only adequate information regarding the risk of 
misidentification should render such consent voluntary.174 
Other exceptions trigger Fourth Amendment concerns, but courts 
may find them reasonable in the absence of procedural safeguards.  
One example is identification procedures that take place following 
arrest.  In this instance, probable cause that the individual committed 
the crime already exists.  At this point, the Fourth Amendment may 
not protect the arrestee from the privacy invasion involved with a 
 
 172. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 558–59 (“[A]lthough the Constitution does not require 
proof of knowledge of right to refuse [to consent to search] as sine qua non of an effective 
consent to search, such knowledge was highly relevant to determination that there had been 
consent.” (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 234 (1973))). 
 173. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. 218. 
 174. Courts already hold that a knowing and intelligent waiver standard must be applied to 
test the waiver of counsel at a post-indictment lineup.  See id. at 240; United States v. Wade, 388 
U.S. 218 (1967). 
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lineup to the same degree.  In fact, the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure go as far as to state: 
Once an accused is lawfully in custody for one offense, the 
Government may place him in a lineup for any number of offenses 
it chooses without prior court authorization, so long as it can 
otherwise assure the presence of counsel at the lineup, that the 
lineup will be conducted in conformity with due process and 
presentment before a magistrate without undue delay.175 
Furthermore, defendants have a right to counsel at post-arrest 
lineups.176  An individual’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches 
when judiciary proceedings have begun against the individual (this 
includes the filing of information, arraignment, or preliminary 
hearing).177 
Perhaps a sensible rule would be to require implementation of 
guidelines to minimize suggestion in lineups even following probable 
cause unless counsel is present.178  As Justice Brennan stated in United 
States v. Wade, 
Since it appears that there is grave potential for prejudice, 
intentional or not, in the pretrial lineup, which may not be capable 
of reconstruction at trial, and since the presence of counsel itself 
can often avert prejudice and assure a meaningful confrontation at 
trial, there can be little doubt that . . . the post-indictment lineup 
[is] a critical stage of the prosecution at which [defendant is] as 
much entitled to such aid . . . as at the trial itself.179 
One should recall that the existence of probable cause in no way 
negates the necessity for a due process inquiry.180  This raises the issue 
of in-court identifications.  Although any in-court identification is 
necessarily highly suggestive,181 it will not trigger Fourth Amendment 
considerations.  In-court identifications necessarily take place after 
the suspect is arrested and charged and after probable cause has been 
 
 175. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a). 
 176. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
 177. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688–89 (1972). 
 178. Post-arrest identification procedures constitute an extensive topic for a later article. 
 179. Wade, 388 U.S. at 236–37 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932)). 
 180. Due process should also require the implementation of the above guidelines.  This is a 
topic for a future article. 
 181. The vast majority of the time, in-court identifications occur where a witness on the 
stand scans the courtroom to identify the defendant on trial.  Usually, the defendant is quite 
obvious. 
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found by both the judge and government.  In-court identification 
admissibility must remain a due process analysis.182 
Exigent circumstances provide another exception.183  It is in the 
public’s interest to allow strictly limited exceptions relying on exigent 
circumstances.  The reasonableness of an unregulated identification 
procedure “depends on a balance between the public interest and the 
individual’s right to personal security. . . .”184  An example of legitimate 
exigent circumstances can be found in Stovall v. Denno.185  In Stovall, 
the defendant was the only suspect presented to a victim at the 
hospital—there were no fillers.  However, the officers had reason to 
believe that the victim was mortally injured and would soon die.186 
One could assert that a likely correct eyewitness identification 
obtained by illegal means might satisfy an inevitable discovery 
exception to the application of the exclusionary rule.  Courts apply 
the inevitable discovery doctrine when it is determined that the police 
would have obtained the same evidence by other legal means.187  For 
example, if the police obtain statements from a suspect that lead to 
incriminating evidence while violating the suspect’s right against self 
incrimination, that evidence may still be admissible if it can be shown 
that the police would have located the evidence through other legal 
means anyway.  When a court applies the inevitable discovery 
doctrine to determine whether an identification is correct, it operates 
under the presumption that, had the police used proper safeguards, 
the same suspect would have been identified anyway.  However, this 
rationale fails on three grounds. 
First, courts generally view the “inevitable discovery” doctrine as 
an exception to the “fruit of the poisonous tree” rule.  Thus, most 
courts do not allow the admission of illegally obtained primary 
evidence under the inevitable discovery doctrine.188  An eyewitness 
 
 182. See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) 
 183. Exigent circumstances are those which present the officer with an emergency that 
requires immediate action.  See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966) (“The 
officer in the present case, however, might reasonably have believed that he was confronted 
with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, 
threatened ‘the destruction of evidence.’” (quoting Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 
(1964))). 
 184. United States v. Brigoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975). 
 185. 388 U.S. 293 (1967). 
 186. Id. at 295. 
 187. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984). 
 188. See id. at 443 (involving suppression of derivative evidence and calling for a deterrence 
inquiry). See also United States v. Romero, 692 F.2d 699 (10th Cir. 1982) (holding that under 
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identification stemming from a suggestive procedure is not derivative 
but is the primary fruit of the police misconduct and should therefore 
not be eligible under the inevitable discovery exception.189 
Second, the inevitable discovery rule applies only if the police do 
not benefit from the misconduct, i.e., the police may not be placed in a 
better position through a failure to act properly.190  In other words, the 
law should not permit the police to further their investigations or 
obtain admissible evidence for trial by breaking the rules or through 
misconduct.  Acquiring identification testimony through the use of 
police suggestion or a violation of the specified founded suspicion 
requirement is a benefit from police misconduct.191 
Finally, to apply the inevitable discovery doctrine, it must be 
determined that the evidence would have actually been discovered.  
As it pertains to eyewitness identifications, an inevitable discovery 
analysis would call for the determination that the same witness would 
have identified the same suspect despite the suggestive or unfair 
lineup procedures.  The Court claimed in Nix v. Williams that 
“inevitable discovery involves no speculative elements but focuses on 
 
the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule, unlawfully seized evidence is 
admissible if there is no doubt that police would have lawfully discovered evidence later); 
United States v. Strmel, 574 F. Supp. 793 (E.D. La. 1983) (finding that to fit within the 
inevitable discovery exception, the government must show with reasonable probability that the 
police would have uncovered the derivative evidence apart from the illegal actions). 
 189. However, some courts disagree that the inevitable discovery doctrine only applies to 
derivative evidence. United States v. Zapata, 18 F.3d 971, 979 (1st Cir. 1994) (“We decline to 
embrace the suggestion that courts should confine the inevitable discovery rule to cases in which 
the disputed evidence comprises a derivative, rather than primary, fruit of unlawful police 
conduct.”).  See also People v. Burola, 848 P.2d 958, 962 (Colo. 1993); United States v. Pimentel, 
810 F.2d 366, 368 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 190. Julie M. Giddings, The Interaction of the Standing and Inevitable Discovery Doctrines of 
the Exclusionary Rule: Use of Evidence Illegally Obtained from the Defendant and a Third Party, 
91 IOWA L. REV. 1063 (2006).  See also Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984). 
 191. Conversely, it is arguable that the defendant should not unnecessarily benefit from the 
exclusion of eyewitness testimony by obtaining the ability to argue at trial the lack of any 
identification testimony.  Such an argument by defense counsel may fairly “open the door” to 
the prosecution’s introduction of the identification evidence.  It is questionable whether the 
mere assertion at trial by defense counsel that the defendant did not commit the crime or the 
defendant’s testimony that she is not the perpetrator would open the gates to the admissibility 
of previously excluded identification testimony.  Imagine the scenario where the evidence at 
trial includes identification testimony from two eyewitnesses that was obtained through proper 
procedures. There exists also a pretrial identification from a third eyewitness that was 
suppressed due to lack of procedural safeguards.  Shall this defendant be precluded from 
testifying regarding an alibi without the third witnesses’ identification testimony then becoming 
admissible evidence?  Shall her lawyer be prohibited from the defense of misidentification 
without such consequences?  This Article hopes to spark future discussions and writings on 
these topics. 
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demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification or 
impeachment.”192  Courts are unable to reasonably ascertain whether 
the witness would have identified the same suspect even in ideal 
circumstances.  Therefore, this analysis is speculative and will not 
satisfy an inevitable discovery inquiry. 
This Article focuses on the pre-arrest compelled appearance of an 
individual in a lineup—a situation that clearly triggers the Fourth 
Amendment, because the person’s body is seized and the individual is 
not free to leave.  There may be other exceptions not contemplated 
within the scope of this Article.  For example, does the placement of 
one’s photograph in an identification procedure implicate the Fourth 
Amendment and require protections?  What if an individual is not 
even aware that her image was placed in an identification procedure 
as a suspect?  The issue with regard to photographs would be whether 
the placement of an individual’s photograph in an identification 
procedure is a search or seizure in terms of the Fourth Amendment. 
The Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment is 
triggered in some circumstances where the individual may not even 
be aware that he or she is being searched.  For example, in Kyllo v. 
United States, the Court found that the following constitutes a search: 
The police used a heat-detecting device only on the outside of an 
individual’s home. When the police discovered heat, they inferred that 
an illegal substance was inside the house from the existence of the 
heat on the exterior of the house.193  Therefore, the Court held that the 
police investigatory procedure caused an invasion of privacy pursuant 
to the Fourth Amendment.  What a person knowingly exposes to the 
public is not subject to Fourth Amendment protections.194 Although 
one’s photograph may be taken without Fourth Amendment 
implications, if the individual is in a location where the individual has 
no reasonable expectation of privacy, it is debatable whether the 
Fourth Amendment should limit what the government may 
subsequently do with that photograph.  If we accept the premise that 
 
 192. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 444. 
 193. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 194. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (finding that what a person knowingly 
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection). See also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) (holding that petitioner could not 
claim an expectation of privacy in friend’s purse). 
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potential risk of harm and error equates to a Fourth Amendment 
privacy intrusion, then we may answer in the affirmative.195 
VIII.  SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The compelled physical appearance of an individual in an 
eyewitness identification procedure constitutes a seizure within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  This Article presents the idea 
that the high probability of misidentification associated with 
unregulated eyewitness identification procedures requires Fourth 
Amendment protections.  This risk of misidentification amounts to a 
significant privacy intrusion under the Fourth Amendment.  This 
Article also explains why courts’ current reliance solely on a 
procedural due process analysis of eyewitness identifications fails to 
protect citizens from misidentification and should not be the first 
constitutional consideration when determining the lawfulness of an 
identification procedure.  It is simply not possible to separate the 
influence of insufficient procedural safeguards in a lineup from the 
validity of the ensuing identification. The Biggers factors dramatically 
fail to measure the accuracy of an identification.  The influence of 
suggestion from the lack of adequate procedural safeguards increases 
the appearance of a correct identification without being a true 
indicator that the identification is actually valid.  In other words, it is 
conjecture to presume that an unregulated lineup identified the true 
culprit. 
The risk of misidentification from an unregulated lineup is well-
documented.  Numerous research and laboratory findings 
demonstrate that human memory is highly susceptible to suggestive 
influence.  Eyewitness identification procedures are particularly 
susceptible to suggestion and bias.  Courts cannot ignore this risk of 
error associated with identification procedures under the Fourth 
Amendment.  Courts recognize that the physical aspect of a lineup is 
a privacy invasion pursuant to the Fourth Amendment.  Cases such as 
Davis v. Mississippi also suggest that the lack of reliability of certain 
 
 195. Citizens may expect the police to exhibit a certain degree of care and reasonableness 
with a photograph, even if obtained legally.  The Fourth Amendment may also require that the 
police utilize guidelines and safeguards with lineups involving photographs of individuals that 
may have been taken without initially implicating the Fourth Amendment. However, there are 
different implications involved with the use of a photo array, and this is a fertile issue for a 
future article.  This issue is by no means clear. 
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pretrial investigatory procedures requires heightened Fourth 
Amendment protections.196 
This Article further recommends the implementation of two 
procedural safeguards for use in eyewitness identifications.  First, 
police must have a minimum of “specified suspicion” of criminal 
activity before requiring an individual to appear in a lineup.  Second, 
specific procedural guidelines designed to minimize suggestion in the 
lineup should be required.  Failure to utilize these procedural 
safeguards should result in the exclusion of any identification 
testimony at trial, because the purpose of the exclusionary rule as it 
pertains to the Fourth Amendment is to regulate police conduct.  
Such a rule is also in accord with general standards of fairness and 
justice. 
This Article suggests that a due process inquiry occur after the 
assessment of Fourth Amendment claims.  The benefits of the 
application of the exclusionary rule to identification testimony 
unaccompanied by procedural safeguards outweigh the social cost.  
No pretrial police investigatory procedure other than eyewitness 
identifications produces significant numbers of false arrests of 
innocent individuals.  Regulation of eyewitness identification 
procedures will result in the protection of the innocent from arrest 
and wrongful conviction. 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
Studies confirm that unregulated eyewitness testimony is often 
“hopelessly unreliable.”197  Misidentifications are the greatest single 
source of wrongful convictions in the United States.198  Courts have 
historically recognized that the risks and hazards associated with 
unregulated lineups implicate procedural due process concerns.199  Yet 
courts’ current due process analyses are unsuccessful in ensuring fair 
lineup procedures and preventing wrongful convictions.  A due 
process analysis alone is inadequate, in part because a due process 
analysis is essentially a fairness inquiry, and courts regard it as unfair 
to exclude a correct, yet suggestive identification, from evidence.  On 
 
 196. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969). 
 197. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 650 N.E. 2d 1257, 1262 (Mass. 1995). 
 198. See Gross et al., supra note 15. 
 199. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 196 (1972); Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98 
(1977). 
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the other hand, the exclusionary rule, as it applies to the Fourth 
Amendment, functions to regulate police procedures and conduct.200  
Therefore, a Fourth Amendment analysis of suggestive identification 
procedures will result in exclusion of eyewitness testimony stemming 
from identification procedures that are unreasonable seizures, 
whether or not the resulting identifications are likely to be correct.  
Compelled identification procedures that are unregulated require 
exclusion under the Fourth Amendment. 
Data regarding misidentifications proves there is significant risk in 
allowing unregulated identification procedures.  Seizures involving 
such significant risk are not reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  
The guidelines outlined here are based on scientific research 
regarding identification procedures and human memory.  These 
safeguards would serve to minimize the risk of misidentification that 
is so prevalent in identification procedures.  Furthermore, with these 
safeguards, eyewitness identifications admitted into evidence at trial 
would carry greater evidentiary value and greater weight with the 
jury.  Prosecution cases would then be stronger.  Procedural 
safeguards would also insulate the police from criticisms of biased 
eyewitness identifications, bolster public confidence in the police, and 
promote a more positive image of the police in general. 
Given our more comprehensive understanding of human memory 
and the influence of suggestion, perhaps courts will appreciate 
eyewitness identification procedures in terms of both privacy and due 
process.  If the reasonableness of a seizure is determined by balancing 
governmental interest against the intrusion, then the Fourth 
Amendment requires procedural safeguards for identification 
procedures on both accounts.  The government has a strong interest in 
protecting citizens from misidentification.  Further, the high risk of 
misidentification that accompanies an unregulated lineup equates to 
an increased security risk under the Fourth Amendment.  The 
Supreme Court has long found that “[n]o right is held more sacred, or 
is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every 
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from 
all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and 
unquestionable authority of law.”201  As Bobby Joe Leaster’s story 
shows, misidentifications do happen, despite strong indicia of 
 
 200. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908 (1984). 
 201. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). 
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reliability.  One can hardly envision a governmental intrusion more 
serious and more offensive than wrongful accusation, jail, prosecution, 
conviction, or even death. 
